**Sustainable TOURISM: The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model**

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**Abstract**

Tourism is considered by the three dimensions of its sustainability:

• The economic sustainability

• The social sustainability

• The environmental sustainability

That corresponds 1-1 to the incentives of tourist bargaining behavior

• Maximizing the economic profit/satisfaction (win: John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944)[[1]](#footnote-1)

• Maximizing the social perspective-integrated bargaining (win-win: John Forbes Nash (1950)[[2]](#footnote-2)

• Maximizing the communitarianism-integrated and complete bargaining (win-win-win Leonidas Papakonstantinidis (2002)[[3]](#footnote-3) in the frame of the complete unifying negotiation, thus enlarging the pie

Unifying Negotiation is an agreement where the parties achieve a qualitatively superior joint result, than what would have resulted from a compromise solution. The goal of a consolidating deal is to create more value, to grow the overall pie. This means that the parties manage to reform the terms of the agreement in such a way that the value the agreement now has for each party has increased. For this to be possible, the parties must come to the negotiation trying to find ways to work together, sometimes adjusting their goals, so that they can structure a better deal for everyone.

The European Innovation Action INCULTUM The EU-funded INCULTUM project (INnovative CULTural Tourism in European peripheries) is considered

Finally, in the case study, three scenarios have been studied, by the chi square statistics, ie

• Tourism incentive is only individual profit/satisfaction maximization- self-interest (win)

• Tourism incentive is cooperation maximization (win-win)

• Tourism incentive is functioning maximization (win-win-win)

Findings showed that people (either as tourist services offers, or tourism consumers) have all three incentives in tourist negotiations, more in individual profit maximization, but also the win-win cooperation, as well as the functioning maximization (in the limit of χ2 critical values)

**Introduction**

Bargaining in the sense of cross-reaction is seen as the science of everything: It covers the processes of animate and inanimate beings It determines identity and viability at the same time

On the other hand, tourism ( Travel & Tourism Sector is one of the most important human activities generating 10.3% of global income ( Global GDP, WNTO 2019) and 12% of global employment[[4]](#footnote-4)

The basic concept for tourism - as for any human activity - is "sustainability" By this we mean economic, social and environmental sustainability

The idea to keep at the forefront of all travel is this: Do no harm. Even better: Do good as directed by the locals.

Over the years, travelers have embraced a sense of entitlement. Their dangerous and destructive behavior was accepted (and sometimes encouraged) in the name of financial gain. However, every traveler is a guest in someone else's home. Those working in the tourism industry need to establish protocols, guidelines and expectations about what this means and need to be clear about the consequences if travelers engage in harmful behavior.

**Tourism win-win-win**

There is an unspoken belief that people should actively engage in sustainable behavior when they travel, but this assumes that people know and understand what this means. It also assumes that they care enough to actively pursue the idea of no harm. While many people are specifically looking to be more sustainable when they travel, the responsibility of making sustainable tourism the norm must rest with those in the industry. If sustainability in tourism becomes the norm, travelers have no choice but to engage in it by default.

Tourism is the privileged field of this economic-social and environmental coincidence

Agrotourism is an even more privileged field as this triple coincidence is achieved through the triad of relationships between the residents who rent accommodation ( People ), the local authorities ( Authorities ) and the tourists who consume tourist services ( Consumers ) A PAC relationship ( People - Authorities - Consumers ) connects all of them with the triple promise of economic-social and environmental sustainability[[5]](#footnote-5)

Table… Agrotourism Relation

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In the event that the residents are not hoteliers, then game relations and contradictions develop between community residents and tourism businesses

As part of tourism development, to attract tourism businesses to locate in the area, governments transfer management rights to tourism businesses that provide a wide range of services, from food and beverage services and accommodation to travel, retail sales and entertainment services. Tourism enterprises rely on their financial, human resources and technological advantages to dominate the market for tourism services and may neglect the living and working needs of local communities. Community residents' attitudes towards tourists will affect the quality of the tourism experience, local economic benefits and evaluation. Local communities are likely to become competitors of businesses, for example, in providing accommodation and in other ways.

In the process of providing tourism services, businesses can choose whether to compensate community residents for the use of their tourism resources and whether to share the benefits with community residents. Community residents can choose to accept the business behavior of tourism businesses or interfere with it

Table …Tourism Relation

 Game relationship between residents and tourism businesses

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Enterprises |
| Residents | Share benefits with residents | Do not share benefits with residents |
| Support | (A1, B1) | (A1-A2, B1+A2) |
| Against | (A1+B2, B1-B2) | (-A2, -B2) |

In this game, the income of tourism businesses and local residents depends not only on their own strategic choices, but is also affected by the strategic choices of the other party. Different strategic choices made by both sides will affect their respective interests and the ultimate goal is to make the best strategic choice. The benefits that community residents can obtain by supporting tourism businesses are A1, A1-A2 and those they can obtain from the intervention are A1+B2, -A2. The benefits that tourism enterprises choose to share benefits with residents and not to share benefits with residents are B1, B1+A2 and B1-B2, -B2. If a resident chooses to support a tourism business, but the tourism business does not share the income with the resident, the tourism business may gain additional income A2, but the resident suffers a -A2 loss. Similarly, the tourism business shares income with the resident, but the resident interferes with the tourism function Behavior, residents can get additional income B 2, but the tourism business loses - B 2. Likewise, tourism businesses share income with residents, while the residents intervene in the management of tourism and the development of tourism businesses

.Residents can receive additional income (B 2), while tourism businesses lose (- B2).

We interpret players' [residents and hoteliers] suggestions and (not) confirmation of game results as an implicit communication mechanism. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of collaboration in the laboratory. Assigning confirmation power to only one of the two players, rather than alternating the role of leader, significantly increases the probability of signing a cooperative agreement in the first negotiation period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as implicit messages about players' willingness to cooperate and their beliefs about the type of others.

Here, a prisoner's dilemma is understood as a metaphor for how the use of uncoordinated selfish actions traps groups of people in a non-cooperative equilibrium as opposed to maximizing their collective welfare. Of course, identifying the conditions under which the dilemma disappears in order to achieve the social optimum with uncoordinated individual actions has been a major topic of a productive research agenda. Among other things, it has been established so far that the iteration of a Prisoner's Dilemma[[6]](#footnote-6) favors the emergence of cooperation towards the collectively optimal outcome, for various reasons, such as learning or, simply, the perfect equilibrium of the supergame subgame. Following these outcomes, the likelihood of reconnecting with the same individual in a social group also increases the likelihood of achieving the cooperative outcome. Furthermore, evolutionary game theory has provided the theoretical background for a similar result, whereby cooperation is reinforced as a collectively successful strategy intended for population survival even under relatively hostile conditions. An exhaustive enumeration of the large number of rules and conditions that favor cooperation in a social dilemma is beyond the scope of this article.

Interestingly, based more on experimental results [[7]](#footnote-7)than theory, we know that explicit communication dramatically increases players' ability to cooperate. However, verbal communication consists of a large set of potential and actual exchange messages and protocols whose effectiveness cannot be assessed unless it can be isolated from other concomitant factors.

Negotiations play a central role in situations of interaction between economic agents. Since the seminal contributions of Nash (1950[[8]](#footnote-8), 1953[[9]](#footnote-9)), negotiation has been a central topic for research undertaken in cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Furthermore, there is a vast literature on rationally justified play leading to cooperative outcomes in non-cooperative games. Several authors have contributed to the understanding of the consequences of bargaining for the distribution of wealth among bargaining agents. In particular, Rubinstein's (1982)[[10]](#footnote-10) model illustrates an intuitively plausible and theoretically attractive way of reaching agreement through sequential non-cooperative play. “Two players have to reach an agreement on the partition of a pie of size 1. Each has to make in turn, a proposal as to how it should be divided. After one player has made an offer, the other must decide either to accept it, or to reject it and continue the bargaining. Several properties which the players’ preferences possess are assumed. The Perfect Equilib­rium Partitions (P.E.P.) are characterized in all the models satisfying these assumptions.

Specially, it is proved that when every player bears a fixed bargaining cost for each period (cj and c2), then:

(i) if **cx < c2** the only P.E.P. gives all the pie to 1;

 (ii) if **cx > c2** the only P.E.P. gives to 1 only **c2.**

In the case where each player has a fixed discounting factor (5j and δ2) the only P.E.P. is **(1 - δ2)/(1 – δxδ2)….”.**

 While the model has been criticized on various grounds, there is little doubt that it expresses the view of most researchers on how negotiation should be structured and how it actually takes place if the negotiating parties have the right to make proposals as well as to reject those received by others to make their own counterproposals until agreement is finally reached. The consensus on the plausibility of this negotiation protocol is compatible with the fact that negotiation models have been viewed as stylized analogues of real situations in which negotiators aim to reach agreement on the distribution of wealth. However, in many cases, negotiation processes pursue more complex goals compared to splitting a pie. Hence, the need for a more flexible accounting arises, especially when dealing with social dilemmas.

**Win-win-win negotiations-examples**

Win-win-win negotiations are those negotiations in which each party (participating directly or indirectly) leaves the negotiating table having achieved its goals through a unifying process that covers three parties, namely the negotiators and the community as a whole that creates value, and not through a bargain or a distributive negotiation process.

Unifying is an agreement where the parties achieve a qualitatively superior joint result, than what would have resulted from a compromise solution. The goal of a consolidating deal is to create more value, **to grow overall pie.** This means that the parties manage to reform the terms of the agreement in such a way that the value the agreement now has for each party has increased. For this to be possible, the parties must come to the negotiation trying to find ways to work together, sometimes adjusting their goals, so that they can structure a better deal for everyone.

Win - win - win cases of tourism development are among others

A "farm to table" in the Caribbean[[11]](#footnote-11),

B. win-win-win tourism formula, thanks to OSLOB whale sharks[[12]](#footnote-12)

C. the EuroVelo long-distance bicycle network[[13]](#footnote-13)

D. In particular, the Tour de France[[14]](#footnote-14)

E Invisible Cities raises awareness of homelessness in the UK[[15]](#footnote-15)

F. \_ the European Action Innovation INCULTUM The EU-funded INCULTUM project (INnovative CULTural ToUrisM in European peripheries)[[16]](#footnote-16)

G. Global Himalayan Expeditions (GHE)[[17]](#footnote-17) is a social impact tour company that leads treks in India to install solar grids and provide electricity to remote mountain communities. Travelers take a multi-day trek to reach these villages, help set up the nets, and engage in a two-way dialogue to learn about local lifestyles and traditions. For their part, locals in newly electrified villages are able to adopt healthier, more environmentally friendly habits, more economic opportunities emerge, and young people choose not to migrate to larger cities.

H. Mejdi Tours takes a multi-pronged approach to its offerings. This means that, in many of the destinations in which it operates, the company uses two guides and incorporates conversations with a wide variety of local people, including religious leaders, activists, academics, artists, policy makers and refugees

In all these cases the tourist activity contributes three times, and in the European Action win - win - win is introduced as a policy and indeed as a European policy

A. on the one hand to satisfy the entrepreneurs' need for sustainability and profitability ( win )

B. to satisfy the needs of users (eg cyclists) for new experiences – consumption of experiences (win - win)

C. In the preservation, promotion and improvement of the natural space (scenario promotion, route improvements, etc., both by the business organizers and by the consumers of experiences (e.g. cyclists) (win - win - win)

Therefore, win - win - win is introduced not simply as integrated (more than distributive) justice, but further as integrated justice that takes into account its social impact and environmental footprint

We now consider this as a socially and communally integrated negotiation, or else a win - win - win negotiation

Finally, tourism is a privileged field on which the triple dimension of the negotiation of sustainability (win), socialization (win - win) and communitarianism ( win - win - win ) is applied, with which the negotiation in tourism is completed

Parties to the negotiation judge the process to be fair when they feel that they have been able to express themselves, believe that they can trust the other party, and feel that they have been treated with courtesy and respect. There is some evidence that market-based options-level solutions are working:

$$y\_{i}=x\_{i}^{β}+lne^{x}$$

𝑦𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝑛 − 𝑤𝑖𝑛 − 𝑤𝑖𝑛 acceptable choices

𝑥𝑖 = negotiators

𝛽 = behavior elasticity (0,1)

e =mathematical constant

Cases

1. If there are 2 negotiators ( x =2) with perfectly inelastic behavior (β=0) then the socially acceptable choices are

$$y\_{i}=x\_{i}^{β}+lne^{x}$$

$$y=2^{0}+lne^{2}=1+2=3$$

1. If there are 2 negotiators ( x =2) with perfectly elastic behavior (β=1), then the socially acceptable choices are

$$y\_{i}=x\_{i}^{β}+lne^{x}$$

$$y=2^{1}+lne^{2}=2+2=4$$

1. If there are three (3) negotiators ( x =3) then they will have 4 or 6 socially acceptable options depending on whether they have inelastic or elastic behaviors
2. This means that there is **at least** one additional choice among negotiators that is socially acceptable depending on (a) the number of negotiators and (b) the elasticity of their behaviors
3. Behavior is considered inelastic if at least one negotiator exhibits this inelastic behavior during the negotiation
4. Must $x\geq 2. $Otherwise there is no negotiation
5. The choice is approximate: For this reason the is used$lne$

**RESEARCH**

The experimental examination (case study) gave remarkable conclusions:

Chi method Square (χ2) we examined three independent hypothetical scenarios (H0) corresponding to the questions whether and to what extent they reflect reality

Specifically, the THREE (3) hypothetical scenarios below were put to the sample of 1390 adult high educated people from urban and rural areas, between 01-07-2022 till 31-12-2022

Tourism is a negotiation - an end in itself

Tourism is negotiation - cooperation

Tourism is a negotiation - a function

**FINDINGS**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Tourism is negotiation-self-interest (benefit) | **79.34>15.507** | **H0** |
| Tourism is negotiation-cooperation | **21.50>15.507** | **H0** |
| Tourism is a transaction-function | **13.74<15.507** | **H1** |

***A. \_ - "Tourism is negotiation-an end in itself" (1.1)***

***Because the value of the control statistic does NOT belong to the rejection region, the null hypothesis, at a significance level of 0.05 is accepted ( H 0 =0) The probability that this conclusion is wrong is at most 0.05***

***B.- "Tourism is negotiation-cooperation" (1.2)***

***Because the value of the control statistic does NOT belong to the rejection region, the null hypothesis, at a significance level of 0.05 is accepted (H 0 =0) The probability that this conclusion is wrong is at most 0.05***

***C.- " Tourism is a negotiation - a function" (1.3)***

***Because the value of the statistical control function belongs to the rejection region, the null hypothesis, at a significance level of 0.05, is NOT accepted (H 0 =1) The probability that this conclusion is wrong is at most 0.05***

This means that in questions 1.1 and 1.2the null hypothesis, at a significance level of 0.05 is accepted Since the null hypothesis is true, it is shown that the random variable , for large n follows a χ 2 distribution with k -1 degrees of freedom, that is, for large n, approximately we have that the control function quantifies (in a certain way) the deviations (differences) between observed and expected frequencies. We thus give an answer to a goodness - of - fit test tests). That is, goodness-of-fit tests enable us to test whether a probability distribution fits/fits the sample of 1390 respondents (chi - square goodness - of - fit test)

**◉**

**CONCLUSIONS-SUGGESTIONS**

From the **findings of the above research**, the following emerges in relation to tourism-negotiation:

**A. Tourism-negotiation (win - lose)**

A. Although tourism is negotiated, relatively limited research has been conducted on **what makes people engage in tourism negotiation.** To fill this gap, research was conducted on the theoretically conceptualized relationships between pro-social (tourism as cooperation and as a function) behavior in tourism and tourism activity. The results revealed that pro-social behavior in tourism has a large effect on perceived transaction quality. . There were larger effects between pro-social behavior in “tourism cooperation” alongside “tourism action-in-itself” as well as pro-social behavior in “tourism as a function.” These latter findings were surprising, as the end-in-itself negotiation (having fun, for recipients tourism services, and to earn as much as possible for tourism service providers) is moderated by the idea tourism-cooperation and tourism-function. The results are valuable for encouraging the active behavior of the concept "tourism"

The COVID-19 pandemic has focused more attention on public health and tourism issues such as biosecurity (Kim et al., 2022b) [[18]](#footnote-18)and outdoor activities and well-being (Ramkissoon, 2020)[[19]](#footnote-19). Although COVID-19 is often associated with relative immobility as a result of quarantine and biosecurity procedures (Kim et al., 2022a), it is also associated with a renewed interest in the benefits of tourism activity, for the “players” of the tourism trade either as providers of tourism accommodations as well as consumers of tourist services

**B. Tourism-cooperation** **(win-win)**

Tourism is interpreted by the negotiation as cooperation (win-win) between hosts-guests (empathy). The management of a tourism transaction mainly focuses on the management of a specific product for tourism which can be understood as all kinds of goods and services used by tourists during their travels. The main objective is to empirically determine the level of commitment of the entities operating in the tourism-oriented industry sector regarding the satisfaction of the end customers with the tourism-related services and products offered. In the framework of this study, the statistical relevance of the elements of active cooperation in a tourism-specific negotiation was analyzed. Empirical examinations covered the evaluation of tourism-oriented supply chain cooperation and its impact on consumer satisfaction. A research questionnaire was used to achieve specific objectives of the study. The theoretical considerations and the analysis of the industry branches in relation to the available statistical data showed that the tourism supply chain covers several entities, the engagement of which can have a real impact on the effectiveness of the management of the entire chain, as well as on the overall satisfaction of customers, improving the sustainability of tourism. The results obtained clearly showed that the examined entities considered the analyzed aspects of cooperation to be very important in terms of supply chain management. These aspects included the overall duration of cooperation within a particular supply chain, which, according to the entities surveyed, directly translated into the quality of the cooperation - either significantly or very significantly, as well as making it much easier to resolve some problems that were closely related to the provision of tourist orientation services. Another aspect of cooperation that was touched upon was the transfer of so-called know-how between the actors involved in a given supply chain. As shown by the examination, 70% of the surveyed entities claimed that it was important or very important. The last aspect of the collaboration analyzed was the relationships between the special trading partners and their impact on the satisfaction of the end customers[[20]](#footnote-20).

**C. Tourism-function-community (win-win-win)**

Although tourism as a function, with the qualities of empathy and communitarianism, does not affect - at least to the extent that individualism does - so much the "tourist negotiation", according to the findings of the research (calculated x 2 =13.74 < 15.507 = x 2 critical value) however, the calculated correlation value (13.74) is very close-within 5% statistical error to the critical value (15.507)

This means that all parties to the tourism negotiation think – beyond personal/individual satisfaction – of the good of the other (empathy) but also of the good of the community that hosts the tourist activity (community)

Tourism is very interesting to understand. It is an activity, it is an industry and an important driver of development for a country, its economy and also for its social progress and monitoring. Tourism undoubtedly brings with it enormous economic value to a country.

What this study proposes is to realize processes that until now were done spontaneously, without being included in manuals

Based on the research findings we now model the production and utilization processes of tourism output – looking for win-win-win futures for: (i) the sustainability of tourism services in small retail markets ( win ); (ii) the strengthening of the host-guest relationship for mutual cooperation ( win - win ) and (iii) the sustainability of the cooperation-function relationship in any negotiation regarding tourism ( win - win - win )





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