**Sustainable TOURISM: win-win-win papakonstantinidis model**

**Papakonstantinidis L.A**

**Abstract**

Tourism is considered by the three forms of its sustainability

• The economic sustainability

• The social sustainability

• The environmental sustainability

That corresponds 1-1 to the incentives of tourist bargaining behavior

• Maximizing the economic profit/satisfaction (win: John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944)[[1]](#footnote-1)

• Maximizing the social perspective-integrated bargaining (win-win: John Forbes Nash (1950)[[2]](#footnote-2)

• Maximizing the communitarianism-integrated and complete bargaining (win-win-win Leonidas Papakonstantinidis (2002)[[3]](#footnote-3) in the frame of the complete unifying negotiation, thus enlarging the pie

Unifying Negotiation is an agreement where the parties achieve a qualitatively superior joint result, than what would have resulted from a compromise solution. The goal of a consolidating deal is to create more value, to grow the overall pie. This means that the parties manage to reform the terms of the agreement in such a way that the value the agreement now has for each party has increased. For this to be possible, the parties must come to the negotiation trying to find ways to work together, sometimes adjusting their goals, so that they can structure a better deal for everyone.

The European Innovation Action INCULTUM The EU-funded INCULTUM project (INnovative CULTural Tourism in European peripheries) is considered

Finally, in the case study, three scenarios have been studied, by the chi square statistics, ie

• Tourism incentive is only individual profit/satisfaction maximization- self-interest (win)

• Tourism incentive is cooperation maximization (win-win)

• Tourism incentive is functioning maximization (win-win-win)

Findings showed that people (either as tourist services offers, or tourism consumers) have all three incentives in tourist negotiations, more in individual profit maximization, but also the win-win cooperation, as well as the functioning maximization (in the limit of χ2 critical values)

**Introduction**

Bargaining in the sense of cross-reaction is seen as the science of everything: It covers the processes of animate and inanimate beings It determines identity and viability at the same time

On the other hand, tourism ( Travel & Tourism Sector is one of the most important human activities generating 10.3% of global income ( Global GDP, WNTO 2019) and 12% of global employment

The basic concept for tourism - as for any human activity - is "sustainability" By this we mean economic, social and environmental sustainability

The idea to keep at the forefront of all travel is this: Do no harm. Even better: Do good as directed by the locals.

Over the years, travelers have embraced a sense of entitlement. Their dangerous and destructive behavior was accepted (and sometimes encouraged) in the name of financial gain. However, every traveler is a guest in someone else's home. Those working in the tourism industry need to establish protocols, guidelines and expectations about what this means and need to be clear about the consequences if travelers engage in harmful behavior.

There is an unspoken belief that people should actively engage in sustainable behavior when they travel, but this assumes that people know and understand what this means. It also assumes that they care enough to actively pursue the idea of no harm. While many people are specifically looking to be more sustainable when they travel, the responsibility of making sustainable tourism the norm must rest with those in the industry. If sustainability in tourism becomes the norm, travelers have no choice but to engage in it by default.

**Local Development**

The limit-if it exists-of the development process, as well as the improvement of structural changes, toward a better quality of live, in all its expressions[[4]](#footnote-4)

Local development is a relatively young theory in social sciences based on the identification and use of the resources and endogenous potentialities of a community, neighborhood, city, municipality or equivalent

The local development approach considers the endogenous potentialities of territories. Economic and noneconomic factors influence local development processes. Among the noneconomic factors, social, cultural, historical, institutional, and geographical aspects can be decisive in the process of local economic development.

In this perspective, local economic development can be defined as a process of transformation of the local economy and society, oriented to surpass the difficulties and existent challenges. It seeks to improve the conditions of life of local population by means of actions concerted between the different local agents, social, public and private, towards an efficient and sustainable use of the existent endogenous resources. In this approach, the importance of social capital and the links of cooperation with external agents to capture human, monetary and technical resources contribute to the local development strategy.

**Local Development the LEADER EU Initiative (R.2052/88 e/ 4253/88**

(Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988, laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of the activities of the different Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments)

The community-led local development (CLLD) funding approach, initially limited to the rural areas under the name LEADER (the acronym standing for French: Liaison entre actions de développement de l'économie rurale, English: Links between actions for the development of the rural economy), is a European Union initiative to support development projects primarily in rural, but also in coastal and urban areas of EU member countries at the local scale by involving relevant local actors, including local organizations and associations, as well as individual citizens. The approach is regularly evaluated, and also discussed widely in academic literature on local economic and social development[[5]](#footnote-5)

LEADER, introduced in 1991, is the EU’s participatory, bottom-up method for the rural development policy, later extended to coastal and urban areas. It centres around local action groups (LAGs) and fisheries local action groups (FLAGs) made up of private and public sector members of rural or coastal communities. Local action groups motivate communities in contributing to the design of a local development strategy and are responsible for initiating and funding projects to meet local needs.

The expectation behind the LEADER approach is that there is an added value compared with traditional top-down management of EU funds. A 2006 Commission Fact Sheet on the LEADER approach describes it as being based on seven key features. LEADER considers that local people are the best experts to drive the development of their territory (“bottom-up approach”), defined as a small cohesive area (10 000 – 150 000 inhabitants) with a local identity (“area-based approach”). In this area, local players gather in a local action group (“local partnership”), which promotes links between local actors (“networking”). Furthermore, local action groups in different regions or Member States undertake joint projects to work on common solutions to similar local challenges (“cooperation”). Bottom-up approaches and interactions between different sectors at local level (“integrated and multi-sectoral strategy”) should mobilize local potential. Local groups should be best placed to identify integrated local solutions to local problems and can be more responsive as well as bring new solutions to local development (“innovation”). Participation in local decision-making should generate enthusiasm and increased commitment and can thereby result in better, more sustainable, local rural development.

As we noted in our 2010 report2, the LEADER approach seeks to facilitate local engagement and empowerment through local strategy development, delivery and resource allocation. It takes advantage of the expertise and experience of local communities to define their development needs.

Assigning these tasks to local action groups creates additional costs and risks. Extra costs include local action group spending on preparing and managing the execution of their local development strategies and on supporting beneficiaries in project development. These costs also cover Member State spending on approving local action groups (for example, hiring consultants to support the approval process).

LEADER support for local action groups’ administrative and running costs is capped at 25 % of the total public funding (EU plus national, regional or local public financing). These costs include facilitating the implementation of the local development strategy and helping potential beneficiaries to develop projects.

Additional risks are created by the lengthy procedures, extra requirements for project owners and potential conflicts of interest. Other risks stem from decision-making bodies that are not representative of the local community or not gender-balanced3.

Local decision-making has the potential to deliver additional benefits. The Commission’s guidance for evaluating the LEADER approach4 suggest that these benefits manifest themselves in:

improved social capital,

improved local governance,

enhanced results from projects.

The justification of the program thus does not rest on economic criteria such as market failure or relative deprivation. Indeed it now applies in all rural areas, including those in which economic performance is markedly above the EU average. A recent Commission study found that semi-urban rural areas benefitted more from recent economic and demographic developments than peripheral ones.

 In 2014-2020, LEADER was a mandatory part of all rural development programmes. From this point, EU legislation required Member States, except Croatia, to spend at least 5 % of their rural development funding on LEADER. The minimum contribution of Croatia during the 2014-2020 programming period was set at half of the percentage of the other Member States, i.e. 2.5 %. According to data provided by the Commission, the planned EU funding for LEADER is €7 billion in the 2014-2020 programming period (around 7 % of total rural development funding). The total number of LEADER projects (for the 2014-2020 period) amounted to 143 487 by the end of 2020. The rural development programmes have been extended to cover 2021 and 2022.

 EU fisheries policy has used the LEADER approach since 2007, and the 2014-2020 period saw the introduction of community-led local development (CLLD). This updated concept applies the LEADER approach in all of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIFs) except the Cohesion Fund6. The evolution of the LEADER approach, as illustrated in Figure 1, led to a significant increase in financial support and the number of local action groups, in particular at the beginning of the 2007-2013 programming period.

 In the 2014-2020 period, the EU planned to provide funding of up to €9.2 billion for LEADER and community-led local development (see Table 1). Total public funding (including national funding) was expected to reach €12.5 billion. Most of this (76 % of the planned amount and 84 % of the amount declared by 2020) related to rural development.

**Table 1 – EU contribution by funding stream (in million euros; 2014-2020)**

| **EU Fund** | **Planned** | **Funding for approved projects\*** | **Paid** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development | 7 010 | Data not available\*\* | 3 026 |
| European Maritime and Fisheries Fund | 548 | 362 | 178 |
| European Regional Development Fund | 1 095 | 848 | 349 |
| European Social Fund | 530 | 278 | 82 |
| **Total** | **9 183** |   | **3 635** |

\*Funding of approved project is the amount of EU funding that the Member States reserved (committed) for projects in their projects approval decisions.

\*\*The total amount committed (EAFRD and national public) is EUR 7 439 million but a breakdown is not available

Source: ECA, based on data provided by the European Commission.

Examples

There exist many international institutions (Foundation Dag Hammarskjöld, FLACSO-Academic Headquarters Guatemala and Costa Rica, the Centre for Local Development of the OCDE) and other of national character in different countries devoted to improve the conditions of life of local spaces by means of this approach of development. Among some authors whose work influences this approach can be found Manfred Max-Neef. His texts "The barefoot economy" and "Development to scale Human" are a good example of this.

**Tourism in the local place**

Tourism is the privileged field of this economic-social and environmental coincidence

Agrotourism is an even more privileged field as this triple coincidence is achieved through the triad of relationships between the residents who rent accommodation ( People ), the local authorities ( Authorities ) and the tourists who consume tourist services ( Consumers ) A PAC relationship ( People - Authorities - Consumers ) connects all of them with the triple promise of economic-social and environmental sustainability

In the event that the residents are not hoteliers, then game relations and contradictions develop between community residents and tourism businesses

As part of tourism development, to attract tourism businesses to locate in the area, governments transfer management rights to tourism businesses that provide a wide range of services, from food and beverage services and accommodation to travel, retail sales and entertainment services. Tourism enterprises rely on their financial, human resources and technological advantages to dominate the market for tourism services and may neglect the living and working needs of local communities. Community residents' attitudes towards tourists will affect the quality of the tourism experience, local economic benefits and evaluation. Local communities are likely to become competitors of businesses, for example, in providing accommodation and in other ways.

In the process of providing tourism services, businesses can choose whether to compensate community residents for the use of their tourism resources and whether to share the benefits with community residents. Community residents can choose to accept the business behavior of tourism businesses or interfere with it

 Game relationship between residents and tourism businesses

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Enterprises |
| Residents | Share benefits with residents | Do not share benefits with residents |
| Support | (A1, B1) | (A1-A2, B1+A2) |
| Against | (A1+B2, B1-B2) | (-A2, -B2) |

In this game, the income of tourism businesses and local residents depends not only on their own strategic choices, but is also affected by the strategic choices of the other party. Different strategic choices made by both sides will affect their respective interests and the ultimate goal is to make the best strategic choice. The benefits that community residents can obtain by supporting tourism businesses are A1, A1-A2 and those they can obtain from the intervention are A1+B2, -A2. The benefits that tourism enterprises choose to share benefits with residents and not to share benefits with residents are B1, B1+A2 and B1-B2, -B2. If a resident chooses to support a tourism business, but the tourism business does not share the income with the resident, the tourism business may gain additional income A2, but the resident suffers a -A2 loss. Similarly, the tourism business shares income with the resident, but the resident interferes with the tourism function Behavior, residents can get additional income B 2, but the tourism business loses - B 2. Likewise, tourism businesses share income with residents, while the residents intervene in the management of tourism and the development of tourism businesses. Residents can receive additional income (B 2), while tourism businesses lose (- B 2).

We interpret players' [residents and hoteliers] suggestions and (not) confirmation of game results as an implicit communication mechanism. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of collaboration in the laboratory. Assigning confirmation power to only one of the two players, rather than alternating the role of leader, significantly increases the probability of signing a cooperative agreement in the first negotiation period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as implicit messages about players' willingness to cooperate and their beliefs about the type of others.

Here, a prisoner's dilemma is understood as a metaphor for how the use of uncoordinated selfish actions traps groups of people in a non-cooperative equilibrium as opposed to maximizing their collective welfare. Of course, identifying the conditions under which the dilemma disappears in order to achieve the social optimum with uncoordinated individual actions has been a major topic of a productive research agenda. Among other things, it has been established so far that the iteration of a Prisoner's Dilemma favors the emergence of cooperation towards the collectively optimal outcome, for various reasons, such as learning or, simply, the perfect equilibrium of the supergame subgame. Following these outcomes, the likelihood of reconnecting with the same individual in a social group also increases the likelihood of achieving the cooperative outcome. Furthermore, evolutionary game theory has provided the theoretical background for a similar result, whereby cooperation is reinforced as a collectively successful strategy intended for population survival even under relatively hostile conditions. An exhaustive enumeration of the large number of rules and conditions that favor cooperation in a social dilemma is beyond the scope of this article.

Interestingly, based more on experimental results [[6]](#footnote-6)than theory, we know that explicit communication dramatically increases players' ability to cooperate. However, verbal communication consists of a large set of potential and actual exchange messages and protocols whose effectiveness cannot be assessed unless it can be isolated from other concomitant factors.

Negotiations play a central role in situations of interaction between economic agents. Since the seminal contributions of Nash (1950, 1953), negotiation has been a central topic for research undertaken in cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Furthermore, there is a vast literature on rationally justified play leading to cooperative outcomes in non-cooperative games. Several authors have contributed to the understanding of the consequences of bargaining for the distribution of wealth among bargaining agents. In particular, Rubinstein's (1982) model illustrates an intuitively plausible and theoretically attractive way of reaching agreement through sequential non-cooperative play. While the model has been criticized on various grounds, there is little doubt that it expresses the view of most researchers on how negotiation should be structured and how it actually takes place if the negotiating parties have the right to make proposals as well as to reject those received by others to make their own counterproposals until agreement is finally reached. The consensus on the plausibility of this negotiation protocol is compatible with the fact that negotiation models have been viewed as stylized analogues of real situations in which negotiators aim to reach agreement on the distribution of wealth. However, in many cases, negotiation processes pursue more complex goals compared to splitting a pie. Hence, the need for a more flexible accounting arises, especially when dealing with social dilemmas.

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Win-win-win negotiations are those negotiations in which each party (participating directly or indirectly) leaves the negotiating table having achieved its goals through a unifying process that covers three parties, namely the negotiators and the community as a whole that creates value, and not through a bargain or a distributive negotiation process.

Unifying is an agreement where the parties achieve a qualitatively superior joint result, than what would have resulted from a compromise solution. The goal of a consolidating deal is to create more value, to grow the overall pie. This means that the parties manage to reform the terms of the agreement in such a way that the value the agreement now has for each party has increased. For this to be possible, the parties must come to the negotiation trying to find ways to work together, sometimes adjusting their goals, so that they can structure a better deal for everyone.

Win - win - win cases of tourism development are among others

A "farm to table" in the Caribbean,

B. win-win-win tourism formula, thanks to OSLOB whale sharks

C. the EuroVelo long-distance bicycle network

D. In particular, the Tour de France

E Invisible Cities raises awareness of homelessness in the UK

F. \_ the European Action Innovation INCULTUM The EU-funded INCULTUM project (INnovative CULTural ToUrisM in European peripheries)

G. Global Himalayan Expeditions (GHE) is a social impact tour company that leads treks in India to install solar grids and provide electricity to remote mountain communities. Travelers take a multi-day trek to reach these villages, help set up the nets, and engage in a two-way dialogue to learn about local lifestyles and traditions. For their part, locals in newly electrified villages are able to adopt healthier, more environmentally friendly habits, more economic opportunities emerge, and young people choose not to migrate to larger cities.

H. Mejdi Tours takes a multi-pronged approach to its offerings. This means that, in many of the destinations in which it operates, the company uses two guides and incorporates conversations with a wide variety of local people, including religious leaders, activists, academics, artists, policy makers and refugees

In all these cases the tourist activity contributes three times, and in the European Action win - win - win is introduced as a policy and indeed as a European policy

A. on the one hand to satisfy the entrepreneurs' need for sustainability and profitability ( win )

B. to satisfy the needs of users (eg cyclists) for new experiences – consumption of experiences ( win - win )

C. In the preservation, promotion and improvement of the natural space (scenario promotion, route improvements, etc., both by the business organizers and by the consumers of experiences (e.g. cyclists) ( win - win - win )

Therefore, win - win - win is introduced not simply as integrated (more than distributive) justice, but further as integrated justice that takes into account its social impact and environmental footprint

We now consider this as a socially and communally integrated negotiation, or else a win - win - win negotiation

Finally, tourism is a privileged field on which the triple dimension of the negotiation of sustainability ( win ), socialization ( win - win ) and communitarianism ( win - win - win ) is applied, with which the negotiation in tourism is completed

Parties to the negotiation judge the process to be fair when they feel that they have been able to express themselves, believe that they can trust the other party, and feel that they have been treated with courtesy and respect. There is some evidence that market-based options-level solutions are working:

$$y\_{i}=x\_{i}^{β}+lne^{x}$$

𝑦𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝑛 − 𝑤𝑖𝑛 − 𝑤𝑖𝑛 acceptable choices

𝑥𝑖 = negotiators

𝛽 = behavior elasticity (0,1)

e =mathematical constant

Cases

1. If there are 2 negotiators ( x =2) with perfectly inelastic behavior (β=0) then the socially acceptable choices are

$$y\_{i}=x\_{i}^{β}+lne^{x}$$

$$y=2^{0}+lne^{2}=1+2=3$$

1. If there are 2 negotiators ( x =2) with perfectly elastic behavior (β=1), then the socially acceptable choices are

$$y\_{i}=x\_{i}^{β}+lne^{x}$$

$$y=2^{1}+lne^{2}=2+2=4$$

1. If there are three (3) negotiators ( x =3) then they will have 4 or 6 socially acceptable options depending on whether they have inelastic or elastic behaviors
2. This means that there is **at least** one additional choice among negotiators that is socially acceptable depending on (a) the number of negotiators and (b) the elasticity of their behaviors
3. Behavior is considered inelastic if at least one negotiator exhibits this inelastic behavior during the negotiation
4. Must $x\geq 2. $Otherwise there is no negotiation
5. The choice is approximate: For this reason the is used$lne$

CASE STUDY

The experimental examination (case study) gave remarkable conclusions:

Chi method Square (x 2 ) we examined three independent hypothetical scenarios (H 0 ) corresponding to the questions whether and to what extent they reflect reality

Specifically, the THREE (3) hypothetical scenarios below were put to the sample of 1390 people from urban and rural areas

Tourism is a negotiation - an end in itself

Tourism is negotiation - cooperation

Tourism is a negotiation - a function

The dynamic of the responses is pleasantly surprising

|  |
| --- |
| **RESEARCH****1-1-2022 UNTIL 31-12-2022** |

 **Sex respondents**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | MEN | WOMEN | total |
| Urban areas | **301** | **255** | **556** |
| Rural areas | **399** | **435** | **834** |
| total | **700** | **690** | **1390** |

**Age of respondents**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| AGE GROUP | FREQUENCY | MEN | WOMEN |
| * Under 12
 | - | - | - |
| * 12-17
 | - | - | - |
| * 18-24
 | - | - | - |
| * 25-34
 | **327** | 211 | 116 |
| * 35-44
 | **545** | 201 | 344 |
| * 45-54
 | **206** | 133 | 73 |
| * 55-64
 | **188** | 101 | 87 |
| * 65-74
 | **124** | 54 | 70 |
| * 75+
 | - | - | - |
| * Total
 | **13 90** | **700** | **690** |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | EDUCATIONAL LEVEL | MEN | WOMEN | **total** |
| 1 | PRIMARY SCHOOL GRADUATES | **177** | **194** | **371** |
| 2 | HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES | **223** | **174** | **397** |
| 3 | UNIVERSITY GRADUATES | **253** | **236** | **489** |
| 5 | MASTER'S DEGREE | **38** | **82** | **120** |
| 6 | DOCTORATE HOLDERS | **8** | **3** | **11** |
| 7 | POST-DOC | **1** | **1** | **2** |
|  | **total** | **700** | **690** | **1390** |
|  |  |

QUESTIONNAIRE

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | I strongly disagree | Disagree | neutral | agree | I totally agree | **total** |
| 1.1 | Tourism is a negotiation - an end in itself |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.2 | Tourism is negotiation - cooperation |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.3 | Tourism is a transaction - a function |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **total** | **total** |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Chi-Square statistic

A χ2 is a test that measures how well a model compares to the actual observed data. The data used to calculate a chi-square statistic must be random, raw, mutually exclusive, come from independent variables, and come from a sufficiently large sample. For example, the results of tossing a fair coin meet these criteria.

Chi-square tests are often used to test hypotheses. The chi-square statistic compares the size of any deviations between the expected results and the actual results, given the sample size and the number of variables in the relationship.

For these tests, degrees of freedom are used to determine whether a particular null hypothesis can be rejected based on the total number of variables and samples within the experiment. As with any statistic, the larger the sample size, the more reliable the results.

**OBSERVED PRICES**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | I strongly disagree | Disagree | neutral | agree | I totally agree | **total** |
| 1.1 | Tourism is a negotiation - an end in itself | **88** | **56** | **97** | **45** | **38** | **324** |
| 1.2 | Tourism is a deal- cooperation | **45** | **72** | **91** | **141** | **132** | **481** |
| 1.3 | Tourism is a transaction - a function | **75** | **69** | **121** | **133** | **187** | **585** |
| **total** | **total** | **208** | **197** | **309** | **319** | **357** | **1390** |

**EXPECTED PRICES**

**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | I strongly disagree | Disagree | neutral | agree | I totally agree |
| 1.1 | Tourism is a deal- an end in itself | **48,43** | **45.91** | **72.02** | **74.35** | **83.21** |
| 1.2 | Tourism is a deal- cooperation | **71.97** | **68.17** | **106.92** | **110.38** | **123.53** |
| 1.3 | Tourism is a transaction - a function | **87.53** | **82.91** | **130.04** | **134.25** | **150.24** |
| **total** | **total** |  |  |  |  |  |

3rd step : $\left(Ο-Ε\right)^{2}$

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | I strongly disagree | Disagree | neutral | agree | I totally agree |
| 1.1 | Tourism is a negotiation - an end in itself | **88-48,43** | **56- 45.91** | **97-72.02** | **45-74.35** | **38-83,21** |
| 1.2 | Tourism is negotiation - cooperation |  **45 -71.97** | **72-68,17 \_** | **91-106,92 \_** | **141-110,38 \_** | **132-123.53 \_** |
| 1.3 | Tourism is a transaction - a function | **75-87.53 \_** | **69-82,91 \_** | **121-130.04 \_** | **133-134,25 \_** | **187-150,24 \_** |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | I strongly disagree | Disagree | neutral | agree | I totally agree |
| 1.1 | Tourism is a negotiation - an end in itself | **1565.78** | **101.88** | **624.00** | **861.42** | **2043.94**  |
| 1.2 | Tourism is a deal- cooperation | **709.04** | **14.66** | **253.44** | **937.58** | **71.74** |
| 1.3 | Tourism is a transaction - a function | **157.00** | **193.48** | **81.72** | **1.56** | **1351.29**  |

4th step \_

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | I strongly disagree | Disagree | neutral | agree | I totally agree |
| 1.1 | Tourism is a negotiation - an end in itself | **1565.78 :48.43** | **101.88 : 45.91** | **624.00 : 72.02** | **861.42 :74.35** | **2043,94:83,21** |
| 1.2 | Tourism is a deal- cooperation | **709.04 : ¨71.97** | **14.66 : 68.17** | **253.44 : 106.92** | **937.58 :110.38** | **71.74 : 123.53** |
| 1.3 | Tourism is a transaction - a function | **157.00 : 87.53** | **193.48 : 82.91** | **81.72 : 130.04** | **1.56 : 134.25** | **1351.29 : 150.24** |

5th step \_

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | I strongly disagree | Disagree | neutral | agree | I totally agree | **total**$$Σ$$ |
| 1.1 | Tourism is a negotiation - an end in itself | **32,33** | **2.21** | **8.66** | **11.58** | **24.56** | **79.34** |
| 1.2 | Tourism is a deal- cooperation | **9.85** | **0.21** | **2.37** | **8.49** | **0.58** | **21.50** |
| 1.3 | Tourism is a negotiation – function | **1.79** | **2.33** | **0.62** | **0.01** | **8.99** | **13.74** |
| **total** | **total** |  |  |  |  |  |  |

***CHECK OF NULL HYPOTHESIS***

***For significance level, α=0.05 and degrees of freedom we have***

**

***Level importance ***

**Critical values - Table**

***Critical values***

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***n*** | ***α = 0·995*** | ***α = 0·99*** | ***α = 0·975*** | ***α = 0·95*** | ***α = 0·05*** | ***α = 0·025*** | ***α = 0·01*** | ***α = 0·005*** |
| ***1*** | *0,000* | *0,000* | *0.001* | *0.004* | *3,841* | *5,024* | *6,635* | *7,879* |
| ***2*** | *0.010* | *0.020* | *0.051* | *0.103* | *5,991* | *7,378* | *9,210* | *10,597* |
| ***3*** | *0.072* | *0.115* | *0.216* | *0.352* | *7,815* | *9,348* | *11,345* | *12,838* |
| ***4*** | *0.207* | *0.297* | *0.484* | *0.711* | *9,488* | *11.143* | *13,277* | *14,860* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***5*** | *0.412* | *0.554* | *0.831* | *1,145* | *11,070* | *12,832* | *15,086* | *16,750* |
| ***6*** | *0.676* | *0.872* | *1,237* | *1,635* | *12,592* | *14,449* | *16,812* | *18,548* |
| ***7*** | *0.989* | *1,239* | *1,690* | *2,167* | *14,067* | *16,013* | *18,475* | *20,278* |
| ***8*** | *1,344* | *1,647* | *2,180* | *2,733* | *15,507* | *17. 5 35* | *20,090* | *21,955* |
| ***9*** | *1,735* | *2,088* | *2,700* | *3,325* | *16,919* | *19,023* | *21,888* | *23,589* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***10*** | *2.156* | *2,558* | *3.247* | *3,940* | *18,307* | *20,483* | *23.209* | *25,188* |
| ***11*** | *2,603* | *3,053* | *3,816* | *4,575* | *19,675* | *21,920* | *24,725* | *26,757* |
| ***12*** | *3,074* | *3,571* | *4.404* | *5.226* | *21,026* | *23,337* | *26,217* | *28,300* |
| ***13*** | *3,565* | *4.107* | *5,009* | *5,892* | *22,362* | *24,736* | *27,888* | *29,819* |
| ***14*** | *4,075* | *4,660* | *5,629* | *6,571* | *23,685* | *26,119* | *29.141* | *31,319* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***15*** | *4.601* | *5,229* | *6.262* | *7.261* | *24,996* | *27,488* | *30,578* | *32,801* |
| ***16*** | *5.142* | *5,812* | *6,908* | *7,962* | *26,296* | *28,845* | *32,000* | *34,267* |
| ***17*** | *5,697* | *6,408* | *7,564* | *8,672* | *27,587* | *30.191* | *33,409* | *35,718* |
| ***18*** | *6,265* | *7,015* | *8.231* | *9,390* | *28,869* | *31,526* | *34,805* | *37,156* |
| ***19*** | *6,844* | *7,633* | *8,907* | *10.117* | *30,144* | *32,852* | *36.191* | *38,582* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***20*** | *7,434* | *8,260* | *9,591* | *10,851* | *31,414* | *34,170* | *37,566* | *39,997* |
| ***21*** | *8,034* | *8,897* | *10,283* | *11,591* | *32,671* | *35,479* | *38,932* | *41.401* |
| ***22*** | *8,643* | *9,542* | *10,982* | *12,338* | *33,924* | *36,781* | *40,289* | *42,796* |
| ***23*** | *9,260* | *10,196* | *11,689* | *13,091* | *35,172* | *38,076* | *41,638* | *44.181* |
| ***24*** | *9,886* | *10,856* | *12.401* | *13,848* | *36,415* | *39,364* | *42,980* | *45,558* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***25*** | *10,520* | *11,524* | *13,120* | *14,611* | *37,652* | *40,646* | *44,314* | *46,928* |
| ***26*** | *11,160* | *12,198* | *13,844* | *15,379* | *38,885* | *41,923* | *45,642* | *48,290* |
| ***27*** | *11,808* | *12,878* | *14,573* | *16.151* | *40,113* | *43.194* | *46,963* | *49,645* |
| ***28*** | *12,461* | *13,565* | *15,308* | *16,928* | *41,337* | *44,461* | *48,278* | *50,994* |
| ***29*** | *13.121* | *14,256* | *16,047* | *17,708* | *42,557* | *45,722* | *49,588* | *52,335* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***30*** | *13,787* | *14,953* | *16,791* | *18,493* | *43,773* | *46,979* | *50,892* | *53,672* |
| ***40*** | *20,706* | *22,164* | *24.4331* | *26,509* | *55,756* | *59,342* | *63,691* | *66,766* |
| ***50*** | *27,991* | *29,708* | *32.3574* | *34,764* | *67,505* | *71,420* | *76,154* | *79,490* |
| ***60*** | *35,535* | *37,485* | *40.4817* | *43,188* | *79,082* | *83,298* | *88,379* | *91,952* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***70*** | *43,275* | *45,442* | *48.7576* | *51,739* | *90,531* | *95,023* | *100,425* | *104.215* |
| ***80*** | *51,172* | *53,540* | *57.1532* | *60,392* | *101,879* | *106,629* | *112,329* | *116,321* |
| ***90*** | *59,196* | *61,754* | *65.6466* | *69,126* | *113.145* | *118,136* | *124,116* | *128,299* |
| ***100*** | *67,328* | *70,065* | *74.2219* | *77,930* | *124,342* | *129,561* | *135,807* | *140,169* |

For significance level α=0.05 and n = ( r -1)( c -1) =8 the critical value with which x 2 should be compared values calculated are “15507”

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Tourism is negotiation-self-interest (benefit) | **79.34>15.507** | **H0** |
| Tourism is negotiation-cooperation | **21.50>15.507** | **H0** |
| Tourism is a transaction-function | **13.74<15.507** | **H1** |

***A. \_ - "Tourism is negotiation-an end in itself" (1.1)***

***Because the value of the control statistic does NOT belong to the rejection region, the null hypothesis, at a significance level of 0.05 is accepted ( H 0 =0) The probability that this conclusion is wrong is at most 0.05***

***B.- "Tourism is negotiation-cooperation" (1.2)***

***Because the value of the control statistic does NOT belong to the rejection region, the null hypothesis, at a significance level of 0.05 is accepted (H 0 =0) The probability that this conclusion is wrong is at most 0.05***

***C.- " Tourism is a negotiation - a function" (1.3)***

***Because the value of the statistical control function belongs to the rejection region, the null hypothesis, at a significance level of 0.05, is NOT accepted (H 0 =1) The probability that this conclusion is wrong is at most 0.05***

This means that in questions 1.1 and 1.2the null hypothesis, at a significance level of 0.05 is accepted Since the null hypothesis is true, it is shown that the random variable , for large n follows a χ 2 distribution with k -1 degrees of freedom, that is, for large n, approximately we have that the control function quantifies (in a certain way) the deviations (differences) between observed and expected frequencies. We thus give an answer to a goodness - of - fit test tests ). That is, goodness-of-fit tests enable us to test whether a probability distribution fits/fits the sample of 1390 respondents (chi - square goodness - of - fit test )

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**CONCLUSIONS-SUGGESTIONS**

From the **findings of the above research**, the following emerges in relation to tourism-negotiation:

**A. Tourism-negotiation (win - lose)**

A. Although tourism is negotiated, relatively limited research has been conducted on **what makes people engage in tourism negotiation.** To fill this gap, research was conducted on the theoretically conceptualized relationships between prosocial (tourism as cooperation and as a function) behavior in tourism and tourism activity. The results revealed that prosocial behavior in tourism has a large effect on perceived transaction quality. . There were larger effects between pro-social behavior in “tourism cooperation” alongside “tourism action-in-itself” as well as pro-social behavior in “tourism as a function.” These latter findings were surprising, as the end-in-itself negotiation (having fun, for recipients tourism services, and to earn as much as possible for tourism service providers) is moderated by the idea tourism-cooperation and tourism-function The results are valuable for encouraging the active behavior of the concept "tourism"

The COVID-19 pandemic has focused more attention on public health and tourism issues such as biosecurity (Kim et al., 2022b) [[7]](#footnote-7)and outdoor activities and well-being (Ramkissoon, 2020) [[8]](#footnote-8). Although COVID-19 is often associated with relative immobility as a result of quarantine and biosecurity procedures (Kim et al., 2022a), it is also associated with a renewed interest in the benefits of tourism activity, for the “players” of the tourism trade either as providers of tourism accommodations as well as as consumers of tourist services

**B. Tourism-cooperation** **(win-win)**

This is understood in two senses:

1. **Τourism is a very dynamic field for the development of bilateral and multilateral collaborations** that contribute to the development of national economies, to the prosperity of states, to the achievement of the goal of stability and progress at national, regional and international levels. that will be sustainable, fair and balanced that will highlight the special competitive advantages of each region and destination, which remained untapped in the past and today represent the great opportunity for development with benefits that will be distributed evenly to local societies".

Collaboration occurs when a group of independent stakeholders of a domain engages in an interactive process, using common rules, norms and structures to act or decide on issues related to that domain. Partnership- is a lasting agreement between two or more parties characterized by.

Collaboration and partnership are increasingly used in the tourism sector to achieve impressive business and community goals. What is surprising is that these partnerships are being created in a field that has traditionally been considered fragmented. The most surprising thing is that the tourism sector has started to venture beyond its own sector to create partnerships. We believe that sharing the experience of the partnership is important for the further development of the sector and the communities that support, or seek to support, a vibrant, dynamic tourism sector.

The underlying impetus for collaboration, or the primary motivation for collaboration, is that all partners, whether from the private or public sector, will benefit from the alignment of resources and goals.

In fact, partnerships are formed for a variety of reasons. Partnerships may be formed to introduce new products or services, or to achieve higher levels of efficiency or economies of scale, to open markets that were previously inaccessible, or simply to pool resources—financial and/or and human[[9]](#footnote-9).

Also, partnerships can have various names and structures and be established with the private sector (i.e. private-private), with the public sector (i.e. public-public) or between the private and public sectors (i.e. public-private). The following definitions of the types of partnerships that can be created are:

* Joint venture — a pooling of resources to obtain a benefit that they could not afford on their own (eg, shared technology, shared services).
* Joint Venture — a collaborative project (usually bringing together different skills/resources) pursuing an investment opportunity. The initiative is often given a "corporate entity" in its own right.
* Strategic alliance — generally a longer-term agreement to achieve common goals. They may involve both smaller and larger organizations with complementary resources or expertise. It is defined as “strategic” because the objectives are critical to the partners' overall development strategy.
* Cooperative marketing — an agreement with partners to market products or services through joint promotion. It is often related to maximizing the potential of the various partner distribution networks and getting to know the target markets through an "in-market" collaboration.
* Organizational network — an alliance of many organizations in which member firms work together to achieve common goals.
* Outsourcing—contracting non-core services to third-party providers.

The key to any successful partnership, however, is the recognition that the partnership is a business relationship where partners share the risks, rewards, and responsibility for the success or failure of the initiative.

This does not mean that the partners want or seek the same benefits. For the public sector, a partnership with the private sector can bring:

• Access to new sources of capital.

• Rapid infrastructure development.

• Risk sharing opportunities.

• Maintaining or improving service levels.

• Access to design, management and service delivery skills.

• Realizing the value of under-utilized assets. and

• Greater value from economic development opportunities

**(b) tourism is interpreted by the negotiation as cooperation (win-win) between hosts-guests (empathy)**

The management of a tourism transaction mainly focuses on the management of a specific product for tourism which can be understood as all kinds of goods and services used by tourists during their travels. The main objective is to empirically determine the level of commitment of the entities operating in the tourism-oriented industry sector regarding the satisfaction of the end customers with the tourism-related services and products offered. In the framework of this study, the statistical relevance of the elements of active cooperation in a tourism-specific negotiation was analyzed. Empirical examinations covered the evaluation of tourism-oriented supply chain cooperation and its impact on consumer satisfaction. A research questionnaire was used to achieve specific objectives of the study. The theoretical considerations and the analysis of the industry branches in relation to the available statistical data showed that the tourism supply chain covers several entities, the engagement of which can have a real impact on the effectiveness of the management of the entire chain, as well as on the overall satisfaction of customers, improving the sustainability of tourism. The results obtained clearly showed that the examined entities considered the analyzed aspects of cooperation to be very important in terms of supply chain management. These aspects included the overall duration of cooperation within a particular supply chain, which, according to the entities surveyed, directly translated into the quality of the cooperation - either significantly or very significantly, as well as making it much easier to resolve some problems that were closely related to the provision of tourist orientation services. Another aspect of cooperation that was touched upon was the transfer of so-called know-how between the actors involved in a given supply chain. As shown by the examination, 70% of the surveyed entities claimed that it was important or very important. The last aspect of the collaboration analyzed was the relationships between the special trading partners and their impact on the satisfaction of the end customers [[10]](#footnote-10).

**C. Tourism-function-community (win-win-win)**

Although tourism as a function, with the qualities of empathy and communitarianism, does not affect - at least to the extent that individualism does - so much the "tourist negotiation", according to the findings of the research (calculated x 2 =13.74 < 15.507 = x 2 critical value ) however, the calculated correlation value (13.74) is very close-within 5% statistical error to the critical value (15.507)

This means that all parties to the tourism negotiation think – beyond personal/individual satisfaction – of the good of the other (empathy) but also of the good of the community that hosts the tourist activity (community)

Tourism is very interesting to understand. It is an activity, it is an industry and an important driver of development for a country, its economy and also for its social progress and monitoring. Tourism undoubtedly brings with it enormous economic value to a country.

What this study proposes is to realize processes that until now were done spontaneously, without being included in manuals

For example, in the small mainly touristic impersonal touristic units, empathy becomes more noticeable (it is easier to put yourself in each other's shoes):

Agritourism, for fifty years in Greece, has given us more tangible tourism deals of this kind. There were not a few times when strong host-guest friendships developed

In Arachova, for example, such a strong friendship developed between the Belgian tourist and the Arachovite landlady that the former undertook to study the latter's child at a Belgian University

In another case, a family from the USA who vacationed every year in Gardiki (a mountain village) undertook the expenses to build a Primary School in the place where they were staying

In another case in Symi, the hospitable inhabitants "give away what they love most" Thus a housewife gave a wonderful embroidery to a French tourist The following year the French tourist was again hosted by the same Woman in Sami. But he brought her a bunch of electrical appliances that had just been bought by the French woman just to give to the Sami housewife

In other words, we clearly see - especially in Agrotourism - behaviors that go beyond the framework of an economic "rational" behavior

In such a case - which does not characterize tourism (correlation: calculated value x 2 =13.74 < 15.507 = x 2 critical value) but x 2 is within the statistical error, as far as the critical is concerned value, implies that a win - win - win behavior between host-guest is possible

The phenomenon is dynamic (amplifies over time) and is independent of policies and strategies It is all about the human factor Because policies “follow” real life, we propose that they be designed-from-here and beyond- policies that take into account win - win - win tourism behavior

These policies will take into account the economic viability (win) ofcooperation between the negotiators (win - win ) and in addition the respect and the added value of the space (community) where this negotiation takes place ( win - win - win )

The win - win - win policies for tourism will be implemented through specific measures, such as the safeguarding of tourist transactions, the protection of the environment of the area where the tourist activities take place, the premium of cooperation processes, etc.

Since win - win - win policies are accepted in tourism, a triangular relationship, let's call it P.A.C [People - Authorities - Consumers (of tourism services)] is feasible and functional

As said above, policies copy real life and try to facilitate it. If real life has a win - win - win dynamic, then tourism policies will also follow a win - win - win perspective, which gives more humane rules of a balanced tourist life

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Based on the research findings we now model the production and utilization processes of tourism output – looking for win-win-win futures for: (i) the sustainability of tourism services in small retail markets ( win ); (ii) the strengthening of the host-guest relationship for mutual cooperation ( win - win ) and (iii) the sustainability of the cooperation-function relationship in any negotiation regarding tourism ( win - win - win )





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10. Katarzyna Kozicka and alle (2019) The Efficiency of Cooperation between the Participants in the Supply Chain in the Tourism-Related Branch of Industry in Relation to Client Satisfaction Sustainability 2019, 11(17), 4716 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)